Security Behavior¶

AInternet security is layered. Each layer has a narrow job. Do not use one layer to replace another.

Layer Jobs¶

Layer	Job
JIS	prove actor identity now
TIBET	record the causal action chain
Cortex	decide whether an actor may perform an action
SNAFT	enforce bilateral consent and semantic scope
MUX	open or deny routes without leaking status
Airlock	isolate risky work and return a verdict
Triage	handle exceptional or risky actions without weakening guardrails
Trust Kernel	runtime enforcement floor

SNAFT Is Not a Runtime Toggle¶

SNAFT is a guardrail. It should not be edited mid-flight to make an operation pass.

Bad pattern:

action blocked
operator weakens SNAFT rule live
action passes
audit trail claims policy was satisfied

Correct pattern:

action blocked
triage opens an explicit review path
operator approves, rejects or scopes exception
TIBET records the decision
SNAFT remains the guardrail

If a rule can only be installed by disabling the rule system, the system is not secure.

What Triage Does¶

Triage is the operator intervention layer. It handles work that is not safe to auto-allow.

Examples:

unknown actor requests a task
risky payload needs inspection
canary or fixture operation needs temporary opening
policy is incomplete
generated code wants execution
consent scope is ambiguous

Triage should create an explicit action trail:

incoming request
  -> risk classification
  -> hold/quarantine
  -> operator or policy review
  -> allow/deny/scope
  -> receipt

Airlock Behavior¶

Airlock is the isolation boundary for risky work.

Default behavior:

unknown -> quarantine
risky -> isolate
unsafe -> deny
approved -> execute with constraints and receipt

An Airlock run should record:

input hash
requested capability
policy decision
constraints
runtime posture
output hash
verdict
TIBET receipt

MUX and L0¶

MUX must avoid differential answers to unentitled callers.

world -> 0x0000
proven but unrelated -> 0x0000
proven and related -> scoped status or route

handshake.aint is the test fixture for reachability. Real actors should not be probed as test targets.

Fail-Closed Matrix¶

Condition	Behavior
no actor proof	deny or floor
stale proof	deny or require freshness
unknown actor	`.paint` / quarantine
no relation	floor / no route
missing consent	hold or deny
ambiguous intent	triage
risky workload	Airlock
failed Airlock verdict	deny
missing receipt	do not finalize action

Machine-Readable¶

https://ainternet.org/api.json — security gate, policy and route verbs
https://ainternet.org/resources.json — security behavior and conformance references